Well, not quite. They didn’t call me out by name. But still… Yikes.
Last month I wrote about In re Arnold, a then-pending case in the Washington Supreme Court involving stare decisis and the state’s intermediate Court of Appeals. I argued that the Supreme Court should stay out of it. Let the Court of Appeals figure out its own rules for stare decisis. Or perhaps the Supreme Court could use the rulemaking process or recommend that the legislature clarify the Court of Appeals’ structure so that stare decisis could work more smoothly.
The Supreme Court did not take my advice. In a unanimous opinion (!) the Court dove right in, holding that a Division of the Court of Appeals should not follow the decisions of other Divisions. I can appreciate the Court’s desire to resolve this problem. But unfortunately, I think the Court’s decision raises more questions than it answers. Here are a few: Continue reading
You know the line about a bad restaurant: “The food is terrible. And the portions are so small!” Well, this is the blog version of that restaurant. It’s not a good post. And it’s so long.
Here’s my excuse: This post is about a currently pending case in the Washington Supreme Court that seeks to set a rule of stare decisis for the state’s intermediate court of appeals. So things get abstract pretty quickly. This is a case about the law about law about law. Yup, you read that right: It’s meta-meta-law. First we’ve got the substantive law: the three-part test, the scienter requirement, the proper jury instruction, the meaning of the statutory term, &c. That’s the law. And then there’s stare decisis—i.e., the law about that law. A court might disagree with a prior decision on the substantive law. The applicable rule of stare decisis tells the court whether or when the court gets to depart from that substantive law. But who determines the relevant rule of stare decisis? And on what basis is that rule determined? That’s the law about the law about the law. And it gets a bit messy.
But first, some background…
Dallas and Marylou Bunney wanted to build a new home. Unfortunately for them, their plans called for a home that exceeded the height limit set by their homeowners associations (“HOAs”). But hey, you only live once. So the Bunneys figured, whatever, you only live once. They built the thing anyway.
The HOAs sued for violation of the HOA covenants. The trial court (1) enjoined the building of the Bunneys’ home and (2) awarded the HOAs their attorneys’ fees for the Bunneys’ prelitigation bad faith conduct. In Greenbank Beach and Boat Club, Inc. v. Dallas K. Bunney (Division 1, May 29, 2012), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s injunction, but reversed the award of attorneys’ fees. Continue reading
Robert S. Moore v. Commercial Aircraft Interiors, LLC (Division 1, May 29, 2012), is not factually unique — person leaves a job, he wants to work for a competitor, lawsuits are threatened, and we end up in court — but the Court of Appeals’ ruling seems to touch on some new law regarding what sorts of litigation threats a former employer can make (hint: lots of latitude) and what redress a former employee has against those threats (hint: you’re S.O.L.). Don’t get too excited, however. While a broad reading of the opinion gives a lot of power to employers to restrict their former employees, I think a narrower (and more appropriate) reading just requires a former employee to produce some (any!) evidence of improper purpose behind an employer’s allegedly tortious actions. Continue reading
There are a lot of facts in MHM&F, LLC v. Edward Pryor, Jr. (Division 1, May 21, 2012), but none of them really matter. The short story: Pryor owed money on a mobile home space, he didn’t pay, so the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against him. Pryor lost.
On appeal, Pryor raised two issues that he failed to raise in the trial court: (a) that the wording on the summons was defective and (b) that the mobile home association for the group of lots should have been named as a necessary party. Pryor claimed his failure to raise these issues below was not fatal because they both went to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Continue reading
“Marni Rice and Michele Parrott were in a committed relationship” — until the two had an argument and Parrott wound up dead. Plaintiff Robin Parrot-Horjes then sued individually and on behalf of Parrott’s estate seeking (a) damages for wrongful death and (b) to prevent Rice from taking money from Parrott’s life insurance policy under the common law “slayer rule.” Continue reading
John Morrison was hit with a bunch of Department of Labor & Industries citations for violations of the state electrical laws. He wanted to appeal, so he did. But he didn’t pay the $200 filing fee for such appeals. Why not? Well, Morrison thought the fee was unconstitutional because the “pay to appeal” procedure deprived him of property (his money!) without due process. Continue reading